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A Robust Resolution of Newcomb’s Paradox
Abstract
Newcomb’s problem is viewed as a dynamic game with an agent and a superior
being as players. Depending on whether or not a risk-neutral agent’s confidence in
the superior being, as measured by a subjective probability assigned to the move
order, exceeds a threshold or not, one obtains the one-box outcome or the two-box
outcome, respectively. The findings are extended to an agent with arbitrary increas-
ing utility, featuring in general two thresholds. All solutions require only minimal
assumptions about the being’s payoffs, and the being is always sure to predict the
agent’s choice in equilibrium. The relevant Nash equilibria are subgame-perfect,
except for risk-seeking agents where for intermediate beliefs, the being may be un-
able to ensure perfect prediction without relying on noncredible threats. Lastly,
analogies of Newcomb’s problem to the commitment problem on a continuum are
discussed.
JEL-Classification: C11, C72, D01, D81, D83, G18.
Keywords: Commitment, Decision Theory, Rationality, Time Consistency.
1 Introduction
Suppose a “superior being” claims to be able to predict an agent’s action and, conditional
on this prediction, influence his payoffs in a simple game of choice. In this game, there
are two boxes, labelled I and II. Box I is transparent and contains a positive monetary
reward r. Box II is opaque and, unbeknownst to the agent, the being puts in it either
a monetary reward R (where R > r) or no reward at all. The reward in box I remains
untouched. The agent faces the choice of either taking both boxes or taking only box II;
his payoff consists of the rewards in the boxes he takes. The being claims that box II will
contain R if and only if the agent takes only box II. What should a rational agent do?
This problem, devised by William A. Newcomb in 1960 (Gardner 1973) and published
by Nozick (1969), is now referred to as Newcomb’s paradox because for both of the
agent’s feasible actions a priori reasonable justifications have been advanced (see also
Gardner 1974). Taking both boxes (the “two-box strategy”) seems plausible because of
the following dominance argument: No matter what box II contains, adding the reward
of box I increases the agent’s payoff. Taking only box II (the “one-box strategy”) may
be plausible because a superior being by simulating the agent’s decision process could
anticipate the two-box strategy, which would therefore lead to no reward in box II and
thus a payoff of r, which in turn is less than the reward R the agent could earn by only
taking box II. Lastly, to discourage randomization on the part of the agent, the being
claims to put no reward in box II whenever the agent’s choice emanates from a mixed
strategy, i.e., a randomization over his two pure strategies (Nozick 1969, pp. 115/143,
endnote 1).
In this paper, we resolve Newcomb’s paradox using game theory based on a belief
the agent should reasonably form about the structure of the game, specifically about
the probability p that the being is informed about the agent’s action before placing the
reward. We first consider a risk-neutral agent. Depending on whether the belief p exceeds
a certain threshold or not, the agent will prefer either the one-box strategy or the two-box
strategy. If the being can observe this belief, then by anticipating the agent’s choice the
being can ensure perfect prediction on the equilibrium path, where, perhaps somewhat
unexpectedly, an agent who thinks ex-post intervention of the being unlikely, ends up
with the low reward r in the unique Nash equilibrium of the game. If the belief p belongs
to the agent’s private information, then the being can devise a mechanism that leads
to full information revelation, guarantees perfect prediction, and implements the (first-
best) one-box strategy, given the two additional assumptions that the agent’s belief is
always strictly positive and that the agent believes the being may be able to inflict a
negative payoff to discourage deviations which therefore never occur in equilibrium. If
the agent is not risk-neutral, his optimal decisions are generally described by two different
thresholds, corresponding to whether, in equilibrium, R ends up in box II or not, should
the being move first. Still, the being can solve Newcomb’s problem with zero prediction
error in equilibrium unless the agent is risk-seeking. Faced with a risk-seeking agent
of intermediate belief, the being cannot maintain a zero prediction error in equilibrium
without relying on noncredible threats.
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1.1 Literature
Nozick (1969) formulates Newcomb’s paradox and links it to decision theory without of-
fering a resolution; he leans towards the two-box strategy on account of the “dominance
principle” which he also defends in later discussions (Nozick 1993, 1997). In the first
account of the problem, rewards are set to r = $1,000 and R = $1 million, and these
amounts have been largely maintained in the subsequent literature. Bar-Hillel and Mar-
galit (1972) argue for the one-box strategy, stating that the “dominance principle looses
its appeal when applied to situations where the states of the world (...) are affected by the
decision maker’s actions” (p. 297). Their solution invokes game theory where the being
acts in order to maximize the probability of being correct. However, they assume this
probability is given exogenously, which makes it generally inconsistent with the proposed
equilibrium of the game. Schlesinger (1974) points out that the one-box strategy might
be interpreted as backward causation, questioning the possibility of free will, which he
considers in turn inherently unpredictable.1 He then attempts to rationalize the two-
box strategy based on the agent’s following a well-meaning observer’s imaginary advice.
Benditt and Ross (1976), Locke (1978), and Horgan (1981) give largely intuitive coun-
terarguments. Sorensen (1983) and, more recently, Burgess (2004) defend the two-box
strategy by separating in time the agent’s conclusion about the contents of box II and the
eventual possibility of revising his decision to also take box I. Horgan (1985) argues for
the “evidential principle” and thus the one-box strategy because “the choiceworthiness
of an act depends solely upon its likelihood of being associated with desirable events”
(p. 432), so the agent should maximize expected utility rather than following “causal de-
cision theory” which relies on the additional assumption that his “act might be a cause of
the desired outcome” (ibid.). The counterargument by Sobel (1988) invokes the possible
endogeneity of the probability that the being predicts the agent’s action correctly, for
the agent a priori cannot “be sure that he cannot falsfify the prediction whatever it is”
(p. 20).
In the early discussions of Newcomb’s paradox, the being’s accuracy in predicting the
agent’s choice is justified by past observations of this predictive performance. Schlesinger
(1974) argues that no amount of inductive evidence is able to increase the agent’s confi-
dence in the being’s prediction performance. Brams (1975) discusses some analogies to
the prisoner’s dilemma game,2 which are again predicated upon assuming an exogenous
probability of the being’s correctly predicting the agent’s choice which generally turns
1Simulating the agent’s full cognitive processes, as proposed by Schmidt (1998) in a realization of
Newcomb’s paradox with “backward causation,” would amount to an artificial consciousness; see, e.g.,
Reggia (2013) for a recent survey. Libet et al. (1983) perform experiments that show that the conscious
execution of a simple voluntary act is preceded (with 150 to 800 milliseconds advance) by unconscious
(nonrecallable) brain activity that increases a “readiness potential.” Langan (2002) notes that such
evidence is not sufficient to decide on the predictability of voluntary actions, as the observations likely
involved mere subtasks of a consciously decided supertask.
2Lewis (1979) obtains a different prisoner’s dilemma where the being is a “replica” of the agent.
Sorensen (1985) notes any finite repetition of this game still produces a two-box strategy in which both
players end up with a low payoff. Cooperative solutions (also proposed by Hurley (1994) as a result of a
“collective illusion of influence”) after infinite or an uncertain number of repetitions are justified by the
folk theorem (Fudenberg and Maskin 1986; Schmidt-Petri 2004); our solution produces a resolution of
the paradox without the need for any repetitions and without the somewhat strained assumption of the
superior being’s incarnation as a mere replica of the agent.
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out to be inconsistent with the pure-strategy equilibrium.3 The viewpoint in this paper
is different, in that the being can in the end perfectly forecast the agent’s choice, simply
based on a robust assumption of common knowledge about the game that is being played
(Lewis 1969; Aumann 1976; Brandenburger 1992). No performance data on repeated
versions of the game or alternative justification of the superior being’s predictive abilities
are required other than the ability to determine the equilibrium of a game, which is then
realized based on rational expectations (Muth 1961) on the part of the agent and the
being.
1.2 Applications
Frydman et al. (1982) and Broome (1989) point out that the problem of a government
committing to a policy which tries to implement measures contingent on agents’ actions
taken under the policy may be akin to Newcomb’s problem. Indeed, when the agents
anticipate the implemented policy measures, their actions may tend to undo the effect
of these measures. Broome (1989) explains this using the example of monetary policy,
where expanding the money supply leads to increased employment (ranked best) as long
as this measure is unexpected, and otherwise to inflation (ranked third-best). If, on
the other hand, the government does not expand the money supply, then provided an
expansion is expected, it leads to a recession (ranked worst) and otherwise to no change
at all (ranked second-best). As a result, assuming rational expectations on the part
of the agents, the best the government can do is to obtain inflation, corresponding to
the third-best outcome. As Frydman et al. (1982) point out, this dilemma relates to a
problem discussed in a seminal paper by Kydland and Prescott (1977) where a government
seeks to find an optimal dynamic policy. Because it cannot commit to its future actions,
any time-consistent policy (which it has an incentive to adhere to at any future time;
see Weber 2011, p. 191) is suboptimal compared to what could be achieved with full
commitment, when agents believe that the initially announced policy remains unchanged.
Sugden (1991) points out that in dynamic games actions can be time-inconsistent,
even though commitment may at the outset be in a player’s best interest. He compares
Newcomb’s paradox to the “toxin” puzzle, where a player is promised a large reward
based on his current intention to drink a nonlethal toxin after having received the reward.
More importantly, Sugden (1991) also notes that in games, other players’ actions are
generally endogenous and cannot, in principle, be viewed as mere lotteries. Hence, a
player’s strategic choice is not reduced to a mere decision problem in the tradition of
Savage (1954). For Newcomb’s problem, we show that because of rational expectations
the probability of the being’s making correct predictions is endogenously determined in
equilibrium and must be 100% (except for one special case), provided the being, in the
absence of other pursuits, has just the slightest interest in making correct predictions.
3Using a Bayesian updating argument in the decision-theoretic setting, Rapoport (1975) casts a first
light on the problems associated with assuming an exogenous probability that the being makes correct
predictions conditional on the agent’s actions. Cargile (1975), Levi (1975), and Eells (1984) provide
related arguments that the probability of a correct prediction must in principle depend on the agent’s
choice, and therefore is endogenous to the problem.
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Figure 1: Extensive-form representation of the dynamic game G, for p ∈ [0, 1].
2 Results for a Risk-Neutral Agent
A risk-neutral agent A and a superior being B play a dynamic prediction game G over the
times t ∈ {1, 1.5, 2}.4 There are two boxes, I and II, where box I is transparent and box
II is opaque. At the end of the game, box I contains an amount r > 0 and box II contains
an amount in X = {0, R}, with R > r, which is under B’s control. An extensive-form
representation of G is given in Fig. 1; some equivalent implementations of this game are
discussed in Remark 2.
• At time t = 1, the being chooses an amount x1 ∈ X to be placed in box II, and tells
the agent that x1 = R if and only if A’s choice (at time t = 1.5) will be to take only
box II, with probability 1.
• At time t = 1.5, without having observed B’s action in the previous period, the agent
decides to either take both boxes or to take box II alone. Allowing for randomization
between the two possibilities, let a ∈ A = [0, 1] denote the agent’s chosen probability
with which to take both boxes. Thus, with probability a the agent ends up with
box I in addition to box II. When pondering his decision the agent believes that
4The somewhat unorthodox choice of the time periods, which include t = 1.5 (instead of using times
in {0, 1, 2} or {1, 2, 3}), is motivated by allowing for the possibility to collapse the game G into two periods
(see Remark 2(i)) and also by the notational convenience that B’s first and second intervention happen
at times t = 1 and t = 2, respectively.
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with probability p ∈ [0, 1], the being can in the next period observe A’s strategy a
and revise the amount placed in box II.
• At time t = 2, with probability p (according to A’s beliefs) B replaces x1 by an
amount x2(a) ∈ X in box II, contingent on A’s strategy a. Otherwise, with proba-
bility 1− p, the amount x1 remains in box II. Immediately thereafter, both players’
payoffs are realized. A’s payoff consists of the combined contents of the boxes he
has taken at t = 1.5. B’s payoff is negative (say, equal to −1) if the chosen actions
are inconsistent with the statement at t = 1 and zero otherwise. That is, B’s payoff
is negative if and only if x2(a) = aR, and it is zero otherwise.
To summarize, A’s strategy consists of the number a ∈ A which describes the probability
with which he ends up with box I in addition to box II. B’s strategy consists of the
tuple x = (x1, x2(·)), where x1 ∈ X is a number in {0, R} and x2 : A → X is a function.
The agent’s belief p is common knowledge.5 At the end of the game, A’s payoff is the
combined contents of all boxes, and B’s payoff is negative whenever x1 6= a and zero
otherwise.6 The agent’s expected payoff is
pi(a, x, p) = (1− p) [ar + x1] + p [ar + x2(a)] . (1)
The three-period dynamic game of incomplete information just described encapsulates
Newcomb’s problem in its standard form. As solution concept we use a subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium (Selten 1965).7
Remark 1 (Does G represent the Newcomb problem?) The main differences be-
tween the standard exposition of the Newcomb problem and the above game-theoretic
formulation is that in G the payoffs for the being and the beliefs for the agent are made
explicit. Regarding the former, our conclusions depend only on the assumption that B’s
payoffs are negative whenever its prediction is incorrect with positive probability. As far
as A’s beliefs are concerned, they constitute in fact the “secret ingredient” which allows
a resolution of the paradox. The agent’s beliefs imply the being’s ability to commit to
the rules of the game.8 Its value has nothing to do with B’s predictive accuracy of at
least 99.9% in the standard narrative (see also Appendix A). In fact, on the equilibrium
path of G the being’s predictive accuracy is 100%, independent of p. The formulation of
Newcomb’s paradox as a dynamic game of the form G recasts the problem effectively as
a commitment problem (see, e.g., Weber 2014) where the degree of B’s commitment is
determined by A’s beliefs.
Remark 2 (Alternative versions of G) (i) By collapsing the periods t = 1 and t =
1.5 in G into a single period at t = 1, the resulting two-period game Gˆ consists of a
simultaneous-move stage game at time t = 1, followed by B’s decision at time t = 2.
5See Appendix A for the case of asymmetric information.
6Without loss of generality, B will never have an incentive to randomize allocations, since doing so
would necessarily result in a negative expected payoff.
7One can also use a perfect Bayesian equilibrium as solution concept (see Appendix A), but it turns out
that the corresponding equilibrium refinement, introducingA’s beliefs about which node in his information
set has been reached by B’s preceding action, does not change any of the results.
8One may also argue that in a fully specified game, no player can violate the rules of the game.
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Because in G the agent is at time t = 1.5 unaware of B’s initial choice, the game Gˆ is
equivalent to G. (ii) Conceptually, one can interpret the last period of G as a device that
with probability p ensures the reward in box II is R if and only if a = 0, and with probabil-
ity 1− p does nothing. However, while such a device would produce outcome equivalence
with the unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of G, the resulting one-person game
(against a machine) would not deliver a plausible explanation for the incentive compatibil-
ity of the equilibrium with the being’s objectives. Instead, by hard-wiring B’s equilibrium
strategy, this interpretation merely illustrates the fact that unilateral deviations from A’s
equilibrium strategy are not in the agent’s best interest. (iii) It is also possible to delete
the first period in G and think of B’s occurring as one of two types, the first being able
to condition its action on A’s action, and the second moving without knowledge of A’s
action. In that setting, the agent’s common-knowledge prior belief about the distribu-
tion of B’s types is described by p. In that interpretation of the game, the corresponding
Bayes-Nash equilibrium would specify B’s strategy at time t = 2 as a mapping from types
to actions, analogous to the branches before the last decision nodes in Fig. 1. (iv) To avoid
an extensive form where the belief probability p is relevant for six different events, it is
also possible to introduce Nature as a player that at time 0 randomizes over two possible
move orders,9 which induces the belief probability p.
Taking into account that the being explicitly discourages randomization by the agent
(Nozick 1969, pp. 115/143), one obtains 10
a ∈ (0, 1) ⇒ x2(a) = 0. (2)
As a result, the agent can never strictly prefer randomization (when a ∈ (0, 1)) to a pure
strategy (when a ∈ {0, 1}). In order to exclude noncredible threats,11 we limit attention
to subgame-perfect Nash equilibria, which can be found via backward induction, starting
in the last period (which contains the only proper subgame of G).
At time t = 2, to avoid the possibility of a negative payoff, B has no choice but to set
x2(0) = R and x2(1) = 0. (3)
Combining Eqs. (2) and (3), B’s only possible choice at time t = 2 is
x2(a) =
{
R, if a = 0,
0, otherwise.
(4)
This corresponds to a forcing strategy, which rewards only perfect compliance by the
agent using the strongest possible incentive scheme, independent of p.
At time t = 1.5, the agent chooses a to maximize his expected payoff in Eq. (1).
Taking into account Eq. (4), for all a ∈ (0, 1) it is
pi(1, x, p)− pi(a, x, p) = (1− a)r > 0,
9Representing the players’ information structure turns out to be more complex for this setup because
the world bifurcates at the beginning of time, instead of (equivalently) realizing at the end of time.
10Since in equilibrium players know the strategy profile, B would be aware of any randomization.
11In the absence of subgame perfection, the being can resort to noncredible threats, for example in the
Nash equilibrium, where the agent always takes both boxes and the being always places nothing in box II
(see Sec. 3).
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Figure 2: Risk-neutral agent’s expected payoff, for p ∈ [0, 1].
so taking both boxes always strictly dominates any nondegenerate mixed strategy the
agent might consider, independent of p. Furthermore,
pi(0, x, p) ≥ pi(1, x, p)
if and only if
p ≥ q =
r
R
.
Hence, as a function of his belief p the agent’s equilibrium strategy is
a(p) ∈
{
1, if p < q,
0, otherwise.
(5)
The agent’s choice depends only on the sign of q−p; it is independent of x1.
12 The dashed
black lines in Fig. 2 show A’s payoffs as a function of his belief p, for the two possible
actions of B at time 1 (corresponding to x1 ∈ {0, R}), respectively. The upper envelope of
each strategy (shaded in grey) shows A’s payoffs given his equilibrium strategy in Eq. (5),
for both of B’s possible time-1 actions.
At time t = 1, the being uses the common knowledge about the agent’s belief p (and
A’s action a(p) as specified in Eq. (5)) to achieve a nonnegative payoff, by setting
x1(p) =
{
R, if p > q,
0, otherwise.
(6)
12The potential indifference at p = q is broken, since by Eq. (4) the agent should rationally prefer the
one-box strategy, i.e., a(q) = 0, for in equilibrium it yields R (rather than r when using the two-box
strategy).
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Thus if p ≥ q, the being can implement a = 0. As already noted, the agent’s choice will
not depend on x1. Yet, the being can guarantee a perfect prediction by choosing x1 = R.
If p < q, it is better for the agent to take both boxes, i.e., to choose a = 0. Hence, the
being chooses x1 = 0, and x2(·) applies to out-of-equilibrium behavior as well. The solid
black line in Fig. 2 depicts A’s resulting equilibrium payoff.
Proposition 1 For any risk-neutral agent with belief p ∈ [0, 1], there is a unique subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) (a(p), x(p)), specified by Eqs. (4)–(6). In this equilib-
rium, the being makes perfect predictions and the agent selects the two-box strategy if and
only if p < q.
Proof. By backward induction x2(a) in Eq. (4) is B’s unique response at t = 2
to any of A’s feasible actions a ∈ A at t = 1.5. Anticipating this response, A’s unique
optimal action (taking into account footnote 12) is given in Eq. (5). Thus, choosing x1
as in Eq. (6) is B’s only way to guarantee a perfect prediction (and thus a nonnegative
payoff) in equilibrium. 
Consider the agent’s expected payoff pi∗(p) ≡ pi(a(p), (x1(p), x2(a(p))), p) in equilibrium
(also shown in Fig. 2). For p < q, the agent ends up with the low payoff r, analogous to
the prisoner’s dilemma solutions. The equilibrium in Prop. 1 does not rely on detailed
assumptions about the being’s payoffs, other than that B should have a preference for
making correct predictions; in particular, no assumption inconsistent with the general
narrative of Newcomb’s problem is made. For p ≥ q, the agent enjoys the sure payoff R,
higher than any solution proposed thus far, except for the cooperative supergame solution
in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma.
3 Results for an Agent with Arbitrary Risk Attitude
The setting of the last section is generalized to an agent with an increasing utility func-
tion for money u(·), which represents preferences that are locally nonsatiated. So far,
Newcomb’s problem has not been considered for agents with a nonneutral risk attitude.13
Without loss of generality one can select a cardinal representation of the agent’s prefer-
ences such that 14
u(0) = 0 and u(R) = 1; (7)
this simplifies some of the discussion below. The agent’s expected utility becomes
u¯(a, x, p) = (1− p)u(ar + x1) + pu(ar + x2(a)), (8)
for any a ∈ A and x = (x1, x2(·)) as specified in Sec. 2. Using the arguments in Sec. 2
Eqs. (2)–(3) continue to hold. Hence, at time t = 2 the being sets x2(·) as in Eq. (4).
13Contrary to what Rapoport (1975, p. 613) claims, a rescaling of the payoffs cannot reproduce the
effects discussed here.
14For any increasing utility of money uˆ(·), the equivalent representation u = c1uˆ+ c2 satisfies Eq. (7)
with c1 = (uˆ(r)− uˆ(0))
−1
> 0 and c2 = −uˆ(0)/ (uˆ(r)− uˆ(0)).
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At time t = 1.5, when maximizing his expected utility in Eq. (8), the agent cares
about the value of x1. For x1 = 0, the agent’s optimal action is
a0(p) =
{
1, if p < q0,
0, otherwise;
(9)
the decision threshold in that case is given by
q0 =
u(r)− u(0)
u(R)− u(0)
= u(r) ∈ (0, 1).
Similarly, if x1 = R, the agent’s optimal action becomes
a1(p) =
{
1, if p < q1,
0, otherwise,
(10)
with corresponding decision threshold
q1 =
u(r +R)− u(R)
u(r +R)− u(r)
=
u(r +R)− 1
u(r +R)− u(r)
∈ (0, 1).
Fig. 3 shows the agent’s expected utility and optimal actions for different utility functions;
the line types follow the same logic as in Fig. 2. If x1(p) ∈ {0, R} can be chosen in such
a way that A’s optimal action is
a(p) = 1− (x1(p)/R), (11)
then B is guaranteed a perfect prediction (in conjunction with Eq. (4)), and thus a non-
negative payoff. Otherwise a perfect prediction is not possible given the said specification
of x2(·) in Eq. (4), which was obtained via backward induction. We now show that the
existence of a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium with perfect prediction, where
x1(p) =
{
R, if p > q1,
0, otherwise,
(12)
depends on the relative magnitudes of the decision thresholds q0 and q1.
Proposition 2 Consider an agent with belief p ∈ [0, 1] and arbitrary risk attitude.
(i) If q1 ≤ q0, then there is a unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (a(p), x(p)),
specified by Eqs. (4),(11) and (12).
(ii) If q0 < q1 and p /∈ (q0, q1), then there is a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
specified as in part (i).
(iii) If q0 < p < q1, then there is a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. In this
equilibrium with a(p) = 1 and x(p) = 0, the being relies on the noncredible threat
of never placing the reward, even when it could be placed contingent on the agent’s
choice.
9
(a)
(b)
Figure 3: Expected payoffs when agent is risk-averse (a) or risk-seeking (b), for p ∈ [0, 1].
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Proof. (i) Assume q1 ≤ q0. If B sets x1(p) = 0 for p < q1 and x1(p) = R for p ≥ q1,
then by Eq. (9) it is a(p) = a0(p) = 0 for p < q1. By Eq. (10) it is a(p) = a1(p) = 1
for p ≥ q1. Moreover, since a1(p) = a0(p) = 0 for p < q1, we obtain A’s optimal action at
time t = 1.5,
a(p) = a1(p),
for all p ∈ [0, 1]. Lastly, at time t = 1 anticipating a(p) and x2(a(p)), the being expects
a nonnegative payoff and would therefore not want to deviate, so Eqs. (4),(11) and (12)
specify indeed an SPNE. This equilibrium is unique, since a(p) and x2(·) are unique,
analogous to the proof of Prop. 1 and any deviation by B at t = 1 leads to a violation
of Eq. (11) and thus to an expected negative payoff due to possibly imperfect prediction.
(ii) Assume q0 < q1 and p /∈ (q0, q1). If p < q0 (resp. p ≥ q1), then A’s optimal action
is a0(p) = 1 (resp. a1(p) = 0). Hence, we obtain a(p) = a1(p) as in part (i) and therefore
the existence of a unique SPNE with the same specifications as before, for these extreme
beliefs p /∈ (q0, q1). (iii) Assume q0 < p < q1. If x1(p) = 0, then A’s optimal action
is a(p) = a0(p) = 0 which violates Eq. (9). Otherwise, if x1(p) = R, then A’s optimal
action a(p) = a1(p) = 1 again violates Eq. (9). Hence, no matter what B’s allocational
choice at time t = 1, there is a positive probability of an incorrect prediction, resulting
in a negative expected payoff. To improve the probability 1 − p of failing to choose a
correct allocation using pure strategies, the being would want to randomize in equilibrium,
eliminating thus the possibility of a pure-strategy SPNE. On the other hand, a pure-
strategy subgame-imperfect Nash equilibrium does exist, with B choosing x(p) = 0, i.e.,
the allocation xt = 0 for t ∈ {1, 2}, to which the agent finds it (weakly) optimal to respond
with a(p) = 0, which satisfies Eq. (11) and thus ensures a perfect prediction. B’s threat
of an unconditional zero allocation is not credible, because were the agent to deviate and
take only box II (a = 0), then B would find it beneficial to respond with x2 = R in order
to avoid an allocation error. 
The critical condition q1 ≤ q0 in Prop. 2 is equivalent to
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u(r +R)− u(R) ≤ u(r)− u(0). (13)
In other words, the utility difference from owning the additional reward r does not go up
when the default reward increases from 0 to R. Since u(0) = 0 by Eq. (7), this holds for
all r, R ≥ 0 if and only if the utility is subadditive, so u(r+R) ≤ u(r)+u(R). A sufficient
condition for inequality (13) to hold is that u is concave, i.e., the agent is risk-averse. In
the special case where the agent is risk-neutral, the thresholds are identical, q0 = q1 = q,
and the same results as in Sec. 2 obtain. When the agent is risk-seeking, that is, his
utility function is strictly convex, the inequality (13) becomes false for all positive r, R
with r < R, that is q1 > q0, which according to part (iii) of Prop. 2 implies a region of
beliefs for which a pure-strategy SPNE does not exist. The expected equilibrium utility,
u¯∗(p) = u¯(a(p), (x1(p), x2(a(p))), p) together with the agent’s optimal actions are shown
in Fig. 3(a) for the “risk-averse” case where q0 > q1 and in Fig. 3(b) for the “risk-seeking”
case where q1 > q0 (where the dashed bold line in the shaded area indicates the support
of payoffs in a mixed-strategy equilibrium).
15It is q1 ≤ q0 ⇔ u(r) ≥ (u(r+R)− 1)/(u(r+R)− u(r)) ⇔ u(r+R)− u(r) ≤ 1 = u(R)− u(0).
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4 Discussion
Beginning with Nozick (1969) the discussion of Newcomb’s problem has centered on try-
ing to adjudicate which of two alternative views of the world is correct, a deterministic
(“causal”) framework in which future outcomes are fully deductible from past states or an
indeterministic (“evidentiary”) framework in which future outcomes cannot be predicted
with certainty and depend inductively on past states.16 Depending on which of the two
is chosen, solutions to the problem were proposed via a dominance argument (support-
ing the two-box strategy) or an expected-utility-maximization argument (supporting the
one-box strategy), respectively, with no possible resolution between these two solutions.
Gardner (1973) noted a third approach by Immanuel Kant which “accepts both sides as
being equally true but incommensurable ways of viewing human behavior” (p. 104). In
physics, a version of this third approach was formulated by Niels Bohr in his “principle
of complementarity” which states, roughly speaking, that reality must depend on the
observer (Bohr 1958/1961; Plotnitsky 2012).
Much in the same way as Bohr’s complementarity principle, our proposed solution
depends on the agent, specifically his beliefs in the being’s ability to commit. And the
being, knowing these beliefs, will react to them. For an agent who thinks it unlikely that
the being can condition the content of box II on his action, the two-box strategy prevails,
essentially because of dominance. On the other hand, an agent who thinks that the being
is likely to condition the content of box II on his own action, prefers the one-box strategy.
In this context, the parameter p can also be viewed as continuously indexing the being’s
ability to commit to an allocation at time t = 1, from p = 0 for full commitment to p = 1
for no commitment. At the ends of the spectrum one obtains the two-box outcome (at low
reward r) and the one-box outcome (at high reward R), respectively. For intermediate
values of p, the being’s perceived ability depends on the agent’s perception of reality, in
particular his risk preference. In this interpretation, Newcomb’s problem is related to
commitment measured on a continuum because an initial action may at least be partially
revocable (Henkel 2002; Weber 2014).17 Instead of a belief, the parameter p then indexes
an objective ability by the being to revise the earlier allocation after the agent selected
his strategy. In either interpretation, as in the Coase problem (see footnote 17), the agent
benefits from the other party’s inability to commit. As much as the being lacks the ability
to commit, the agent’s own action becomes influential in determining the final payoffs of
the game.
The solution to Newcomb’s problem presented in Secs. 2 and 3 is robust in the sense
that almost no assumptions were made about the being’s intentions, other than a pref-
erence for making correct predictions.18 The being also does not need very complex dis-
16Nozick (1993, pp. 44–45) acknowledges that decisions in Newcomb’s problem may depend on the
relative magnitude of the reward R compared to r and that for larger q = r/R the dominance (“causal”)
argument is less plausible.
17The continuum of commitment appears in discussions about the robustness of the Coase conjecture
(Coase 1972) which depends on zero commitment. The degree of commitment available to a monopolist in
the Coase setup varies continuously with the length of time that passes until the price for a durable good
can be changed (Gul et al. 1986); an analogous situation is obtained with varying degrees of perishability
of goods to be sold (Cho 2007).
18In virtually all extant game-theoretical approaches, the “superior being” is assumed a “replica” of
the agent (see also footnote 2), which amounts to an introspective approach that is difficult to justify for
12
tributional assumptions about the agent’s potential preferences other than the decision
threshold q (resp. q1 in the case with general risk attitude; see Sec. 3). Even if the being
operates in the complete absence of any information about the agent (see Appendix A),
there is a high chance, given the small q = r/R = .001 (using the standard numbers), that
the being’s decisions would lead to correct predictions, exactly as in the usual narrative
of Newcomb’s problem.
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any concrete instantiation of the game, the original description of which, by Nozick (1969), is asymmetric
to begin with.
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Appendix A: Asymmetric Information
Suppose that information about a risk-neutral agent’s belief is private, or equivalently,
that the being faces a population of different agents with beliefs θ ∈ Θ = [θ
¯
, θ¯], where 0 ≤
θ
¯
≤ θ¯ ≤ 1. B encounters one of these agents at random.19 From the preceding analysis
we have seen that what matters for the agent’s binary decision is whether his beliefs are
above or below the threshold q = r/R. Hence, when designing a mechanism (M, ξ) to
reveal the agent’s information, B can restrict attention to a binary message space M =
{L,H}, where L is a message that (if truthful) indicates a low type (p < q), and H
is a message that (if truthful) indicates a high type (p ≥ q). For each action-message
tuple (a,m) ∈ A ×M, the being chooses the allocation ξ(a,m) = (ξ1(m), ξ2(a,m)). To
minimize the prediction error on the equilibrium path, B does not randomize allocations,
so ξ(a,m) ∈ {(0, 0), (ν,R), (R, ν), (R,R)} for all (a,m) ∈ A×M, where ν is a real number
to be determined below. Analogous to the equilibrium concept chosen in the main text,
we limit attention to perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria.
Proposition 3 When the information about the belief p = θ is private to the agent
and θ
¯
> 0, there is a revelation mechanism under which the agent does not object to
reporting his beliefs truthfully and the being makes no mistakes.
Proof. Given a mechanism (M, ξ), let (α, µ) with α : Θ→ A and µ : Θ→M be
the agent’s strategy. Then
(α(θ), µ(θ)) ∈ arg max
(a,m)∈A×M
{ar + (1− θ)ξ1(m) + θξ2(a,m)}
To avoid mistakes, B has no choice but to discourage a ∈ (0, 1) by leaving box II empty,
that is ξ2(a,m) = 0 irrespective of m; therefore randomization is never optimal for the
agent. Consider an allocation function ξ = (ξ1, ξ2) with ξ1 :M→ R and ξ2 : A×M→ R
with
ξ1(L) = ξ1(H) = R, (14)
and
ξ2(a,m) =


R, if a = 0,
ν, if (a,m) = (1, L),
0, otherwise,
(15)
where the real number ν is determined below. We know for θ < q the agent prefers (1, L)
and for θ ≥ q he prefers (0, H) in the set of deterministic actions (a,m) in {(0, L), (1, L), (0, R), (1, R)}.
That is, any agent reports truthfully whether his belief is above or below the threshold
and otherwise chooses the one-box strategy.
1. θ ∈ [q, θ¯]: The agent prefers (0, H) to (1, H), since by Eqs. (14)–(15):
(1− θ)ξ1(H) + θξ2(0, H) = R > (1− θ)R = (1− θ)ξ1(H) + θξ2(1, H).
Furthermore, (0, H) is (weakly) preferred to (0, L) since either action yields a sure
payoff of R. Lastly, (0, H) is also preferred to (1, L) because
(1−θ)ξ1(H)+θξ2(0, H) = R ≥ r+(1−θ)ξ1(L)+θξ2(1, L) = r+(1−θ)R+θξ2(1, L),
for all θ ≥ q = r/R, which is equivalent to ξ2(1, L) ≤ 0.
19The situation in Sec. 2 obtains for θ
¯
= θ¯ = p, so Θ = {p}.
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2. θ ∈ [θ
¯
, q): By Eqs. (14)–(15) the agent prefers (0, L) to (1, L) and to (1, H) if and
only if
R ≥ r + (1− θ)R + θν.
This inequality is satisfied for all θ ∈ [θ
¯
, q) if B sets
ν ≡ R−
r
θ
¯
= −
(
q
θ
¯
− 1
)
R.
Finally, the agent (weakly) prefers (0, L) to (0, H), for he is guaranteed a certain
payoff of R.
This concludes our proof. 
The mechanism specified in Prop. 3 depends on the being’s ability to deter the agent from
deviations with negative payoffs. The being therefore needs to be able to credibly threaten
the agent, saying something to the effect that if B gets to choose at time t = 2 and finds
that a 6= x1 = 0, then box II is likely to “explode” when the agent opens it. Without
this threat, the only other possibility for the being is to revert to the Nash equilibrium
where B never puts any reward in box II, relying on the noncredible threat discussed at
the end of the proof of Prop. 2.
When the agent has a general risk attitude, B is left with a similar dichotomy and
thus needs to decide whether case (iii) in Prop. 2 applies or not. If negative payoffs
can be implemented, then a mechanism analogous to the one in Prop. 3 can be found.
Otherwise, B needs to form beliefs about the population of agents. For example, if in
the risk-neutral case, agents’ types (beliefs) are uniformly distributed on Θ = [0, 1], then
for q = .001 the being in the equilibrium specified in Prop. 1, assuming p ≥ q, would
make a correct prediction 99.9% of the time, consistent with the standard narrative of
Newcomb’s problem. Note also that in our resolution of Newcomb’s problem, the agent
does not need to make any assumptions (other than the structure of the game, which
we have tacitly assumed to be common knowledge), but rather just act according to his
beliefs.
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